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VFR FLIGHT INTO IMC: REDUCING THE HAZARD
Dale R. Wilson and Teresa A. Sloan

ABSTRACT

Aircraft accidents resulting from initiating or continuing visual flight rules (VFR) flight into instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC) continue to be one of the leading causes of fatal aircraft accidents. This paper outlines the nature and
scope of this hazard and reviews past and present initiatives designed to reduce it. It also suggests future interventions
that may be effective in reducing the threat of this aviation hazard.
INTRODUCTION

Aircraft accidents resulting from initiating or
continuing visual flight rules (VFR) flight into instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC) is one of the leading
causes of fatal aircraft accidents. When VFR-into-IMC
accident pilots inadvertently enter cloud, they either fly
under controlled flight into terrain (CFTT) or experience
spatial disorientation and lose control of the aircraft
resulting in an unrecoverable unusual flight attitude (e.g.,
spin or graveyard spiral) or inflight structural failure.
Studies conducted at the University of Illinois indicate that
for the pilot who does not have adequate instrument flight
training, the average time from cloud entry to loss of
control or ground impact is 178 seconds ("178 seconds,"
n.d.). Unfortunately, the accident record indicates that VFR
flight into IMC continues to be a significant threat to
aviation safety. This paper outlines the nature and scope of
the hazard, reviews past and present initiatives designed to
reduce it, and suggests future interventions which may be
effective in reducing this aviation hazard. VFR-into-IMC
Accident Record
The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) found that during the twelve years through 1975 to
1986, even though VFR flight into IMC accounted for only
4% of U.S. general aviation (GA) accidents, it was
responsible for 16.7% and 19% of fatal GA accidents and
fatalities respectively (NTSB, 1989). For a similar time
period in Canada (1976 to 1985), the Transportation Safety
Board of Canada (TSBC) found that continued VFR flight
into IMC accounted for only 6% of all aviation accidents
yet was responsible for 23% of fatal accidents and 26% of
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fatalities, making it the leading single cause of aviation
fatalities in that country (TSBC, 1990a). During this
period, a combined total of approximately 1770
VFR-into-IMC accidents occurred in both countries,
averaging one accident and 1.5 fatalities every two days
(NTSB, 1989; TSBC, 1990a). Similar findings are reported
for the United Kingdom (UK) where continued flight into
adverse weather was responsible for an average of 24% of
all single-engine aircraft accidents for the 15 years between
1980 and 1994, and one-third of all fatal GA accidents in
1994 alone (Leannount, 1995).
These data indicate that even though the incidence
of VFR-into-IMC accidents is quite low, they are
responsible for a disproportionately high percentage of fatal
accidents and fatalities. For example, the NTSB study
(1989) found 17.3% of all GA accidents resulted in
fatalities, yet a full 72.2% of VFR-into-IMC accidents were
fatal. A recent Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA) Air Safety Foundation (1996) study of
VFR-into-IMC accidents, which occurred between 1982
and 1993, found an even higher percentage (82%) of these
accidents involved fatalities.
Even though the percentage of U.S. GA
VFR-into-IMC accidents dropped from 4% in 1982 to 3%
by 1993-which reflects the overall decline in
weather-related accidents from 31% in 1982 to 20% in
1993 (AOPA, 1996)~there is evidence that it may have
leveled off. A recent weather safety study conducted by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) found the
percentage of weather-related accidents to total accidents
remains stable at 23% since 1995 (FAA, n.d.). Since
approximately 70%
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of fetal GA weather-related accidents result from attempted
VFR flight into IMC (AOPA, 1999, 2001), it is likely that
this leveling off in the proportion of weather-related
accidents reflects an overall leveling off of the
VFR-into-IMC accident rate as well. Regardless, recent
data make it clear that VFR flight into IMC is still the
leading cause of fetal G A weather-related accidents and
continues to be one of the most frequent causes of all
fatal GA accidents (AOPA 19%, 2001). Type of Flight
Operations
Many VFR-into-IMC accidents involve G A aircraft used
primarily for personal purposes and piloted mostly by
relatively low-time pilots. For example, of the 361
VFR-into-IMC accidents in the United States between
1983 and early 1987,62% of pilots were flying their own
aircraft and 75% of the accident flights were for personal
purposes (NTSB, 1989). Between 1989 and 1999, the
FAA found that 71% of 14 CFR Part 91 aircraft involved
in weather-related accidents were used for personal
purposes (FAA, n.d). The AOPA Air Safety Foundation
(1996) also reported that 58% of G A VFR-into-IMC
accident pilots had fewer than one thousand hours of flight
experience. However, only 5% had fewer than one
hundred hours, presumably because these pilots fly
mostly under the supervision of a flight instructor in a
relatively protected training environment.
However, these accidents are not solely restricted

to low-time GA pilots—a surprisingly high proportion
involve experienced pilots and those engaged in
commercial flight operations. One-third of GA
VFR-into-IMC accidents in the United States involved
pilots with one thousand flight hours or more and
one-quarter involved pilots with over two thousand
hours. In Canada, almost 20% of the accident pilots had
three thousand or more hours of flight experience
(AOPA, 19%; NTSB, 1989, TSBC, 1990a). Recent
studies also indicate that a significant portion of CFTT
accidents—the world's leading cause of commercial
aviation fatalities (Menzel, 1998)-are the result of
attempted VFR flight into IMC. Khatwa and Roelen
(19%) found that VFR flight into IMC was responsible
for at least 19% of worldwide commercial CFTT accidents
that occurred between 1988 and 1994. (The percentage is
likely higher since data were missing in 43% of the sample
accidents.) An even higher percentage is reported in
Canada where over half of the seventy commercial
CFTT accidents between 1984 and 1994 involved flight
crews attempting visual flight in IMC (TSBC, 19%).
Commercial flight operations in Canada shared a
significant proportion of that country's VFR-into-IMC
accidents~a full 35% over a ten-year period (TSBC,
1990a). In the United States, Alaska has the worst record
for VFR-into-IMC accidents, not only in the GA sector but
for commercial flight operations as well (see Figure 1).

•Alaska
Q Remainder of U.S.

Commuter
Airlines

Air Taxis

General Aviation

Figure 1. VFR-into-IMC accident rates for five-year period 1989 though 1993. Adapted from Safety study: Aviation safety in
Alaska (NTSB/SS-95/03), (p. 24), 1995, Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
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For the five-year period between 1989 and 1993, these
accidents were responsible for 47% and 67% of Alaska's
fatal air taxi and commuter accidents respectively (NTSB,
1995). In fact, a recent study conducted by the U.S.
National Institute for Occupational Safely and Health
(NIOSH) found that aircraft accidents are the leading cause
of occupational fatalities in Alaska, and that CFTT resulting
from attempted flight into IMC is the number one cause of
these accidents (Hall, 19%; LaBelle, 1999).
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Adverse Weather

A number of environmental factors increase the
probability of VFR-into-IMC accidents. The first obvious
factor is adverse weather in the form of cloud, precipitation,
or fog. VFR flight dictates that minimum cloud clearance
and visibility requirements be met, and for certain flight
operations (e.g., 14 CFR Part 135 VFR helicopter
operations in the United States) and countries (such as
Canada) visual contact with the earth's surface must be
maintained. Mountainous Terrain
Adding mountainous terrain to VFR flight in
marginal weather substantially increases the risk. Over half
of all VFR-into-IMC accidents for a ten-year period in
Canada occurred in mountainous terrain (TSBC, 1990b).
Also, 62% of foreign-registered VFR-into-IMC accidents in
Canada occurred in the mountainous regions of British
Columbia (BC) and the Yukon Territory (TSBC, 1990b).
Over the most recent ten-year period for which data is
available (1991-2000), British Columbia continued to have
the highest number of fatal accidents-about 39% more
than Ontario, the province with the highest number of total
accidents (TSBC, 2001).
Of the ten U.S. states that had the highest percentage
of VFR-into-IMC accidents between 1975 and 1986, eight
are located in FAA-designated mountainous areas (NTSB,
1989). For fiscal years 1989-1993, the U.S. General
Accounting Office (USGAO) found the GA accident rate
for the eleven western continental states (all
FAA-designated mountainous areas) averaged 2.4
accidents per 100,000 operations- 40% higher than the
rate of 1.7 for the other thirty-seven continental states
(USGAO, 1993). Also, the average rate for Hawaii and
Alaska-both
within
designated
mountainous
areas-exceeded the 1.7 rate by 39% and 580%
respectively (USGAO, 1993).
Mountain ranges located in western North America
act as natural lifting agents for moist air moving inland
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from the Pacific Ocean. When the base of overcast cloud
drops below the mountaintops, a giant labyrinth consisting
of a limited number of narrow winding corridors results.
For the pilot who attempts VFR flight under the cloud, a
practice often referred to as scud running, the lack of
remaining available options (i.e., VFR over-the-top, IFR
clearance, reverse course) substantially increases the risk.
Pilots can inadvertently fly into a dead-end valley where
terrain rises faster than the aircraft can climb or get boxed
into a narrow valley with little or no room to perform a
180-degree turn. Also, rapidly changing mountain weather
can close in behind pilots leaving them no way out. Night
Another important environmental factor that
increases the level of risk is the darkness of night. There is
an increased chance of inadvertent entry into cloud or fog
at night (AOPA, 1996; Wilson, 1999). A full third of all
VFR-into-IMC accidents in the United States and 30% of
such accidents in Canada occur at night, even though the
estimated GA VFR activity in both countries at night is
only about 10% (AOPA, 1996, NTSB, 1989; TSBC,
1990b). Also, the major cause of fatal commercial
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) helicopter accidents
over a nine-year period was VFR flight into IMC, with
most occurring at night (NTSB, 1988). Even in good visual
meteorological conditions (VMC) there is an increased
accident risk for VFR flight at night (Wilson, 1999). How
much more is the risk in adverse weather? As the following
account illustrates, it can be very difficult to detect
inclement weather at night.
I left XYZ later than I originally intended. In retrospect,
I should not have left at a time that would require night
VFR flight, given the cloud conditions. . . . I did not notice
entering IMC at first, and, in fact, remember being
curious why the anti-collision lights were illuminating
the cockpit and causing a strobe effect on the prop.
Shortly thereafter, I noticed that the turn coordinator was
pegged in a left turn, the attitude indicator showed a
45-60° left bank, the directional gyro was spinning
rapidly. . . . I recognized the signs of [an impending]
"graveyard spiral" and was able to return the plane to
straight-and-level flight. The real cause [of this incident]
was ... lack of appreciation of the danger of night VFR.
("Night for Day," 19%, p. 1) A number of initiatives
have been undertaken to reduce the VFR-into-IMC
hazard. These have focused
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primarily on: 1.) regulatory reforms, 2.) improving the
operational environment, 3.) developing advanced
technology, and 4.) enhancing pilot training and
education.
REGULATORY REFORMS
VFR Weather Minima

In both the United States and Canada,
VFR-into-IMC accidents have occurred in meteorological
conditions which met or exceeded the minimum
regulatory requirements ("Night-visual flight rules,"
1989; TSBC, 1990b, 19%). These mininuuns have also
been cited as a contributing factor in some of these
accidents (TSBC, 19%). Investigators, citing scientific
data regarding the inherent limitations of human
depth/distance perception and information processing
ability, conclude that when pilots fly in the impoverished
visual conditions of marginal VFR weather, it is virtually
impossible not only to accurately judge one mile visibility
from a moving aircraft, but to detect deteriorating
conditions in time to avoid inadvertent flight into IMC
(TSBC, 1996). Just as automobile drivers can overdrive
their headlights when driving at night, precluding them
from detecting objects in sufficient time to avoid a
collision, so too is it easy for pilots to overfly their
visibility when flying in conditions of reduced visibility.
Exacerbating the problem is the phenomenon of aerial
perspective, where distances from objects and terrain tend
to be overestimated in conditions of reduced visibility
(Ross, 1975). Also, in mountainous terrain maneuvering
room is minimal when flying through narrow valleys under
an overcast cloud deck. The increase in turning radius
which occurs at the higher altitudes usually associated
with mountain flying makes it difficult for pilots to safely
execute a ISO-degree course reversal should one be
required.
Regulatory agencies have recognized the
inadequate margin of safety provided by traditional VFR.
weather minima. For example, in 1989 the United States
raised the minimum of one mile visibility (and clear of
cloud) applicable to VFR flights in uncontrolled (class G)
airspace at night, to the higher controlled airspace (class C,
D & E) minimum of three miles visibility (with minimum
horizontal/vertical
cloud
clearance
distances)
("Night-visual flight rules," 1989). Canada followed suit in
19% by raising the one-mile visibility requirement to three
miles in uncontrolled airspace at night (Transport Canada,
1996a). For special VFR operations at night, both the
United States (under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations
[14 CFR]) and
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UK require pilots and their aircraft to be certified for
instrument flight, and Canada now only authorizes it for
the purpose of getting the aircraft safely on the ground (14
CFR 91.157(b), 2000; Transport Canada, 1996b). In
response to the dramatic increase in air tour accidents in
the state of Hawaii, the FAA also published Special Federal
Aviation Regulation (SFAR) Number 71-1, which
effectively increases the weather minima by requiring VFR
flights to operate above 1500 feet AGL ("Air tour
operators," 1994). However, even though commercial VFR
Part 135 air carriers require two miles visibility and
recreational pilots are restricted to three, the basic visibility
in uncontrolled airspace for day VFR operations in the
United States still remains at one statute mile (14 CFR
135.205(a), 1991; 14 CFR 91.155(a), 1993; 14 CFR
61.101(d), 1997).
Recognizing the increased risk for VFR flight
operations in mountainous terrain and in response to TSBC
recommendation A90-67 (1990a), Canada raised the
minimum visibility requirement to two miles in designated
mountainous regions, then subsequently expanded the rule
to apply to all uncontrolled airspace below 1,000 feet AGL
during daylight hours (Transport Canada, 1996a; TSBC,
19%). Other countries have higher visibility requirements
for day VFR flight in uncontrolled airspace. For example,
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK require a minimum of
three statute miles visibility (Civil Aviation Authority of
New Zealand, 2002; Civil Aviation Safety Authority of
Australia, 2002; United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority,
19%). The FAA may wish to consider the safety benefits of
increasing the minimum visibility requirement for day VFR
operations, if not for all low-level uncontrolled airspace,
then at least for designated mountainous regions.
Single-engine Commercial IFR Flight
A regulatory change that should lead to fewer
fatalities involves allowing commercial passenger-carrying
flights to operate under instrument flight rules (IFR) in
single-engine aircraft. Canada has allowed single-engine
IFR (SEIFR) passenger-carrying flights in turbine-powered
aircraft since 1993 ("Commercial passenger-carrying,"
1997; Transport Canada, 1996c). The United States
followed suit in 1998 by allowing commercial SEIFR
passenger-carrying operations in both turbine and
reciprocating engine aircraft, provided minimum
equipment and maintenance requirements are met
("Commercial passenger-carrying," 1997). Noting that
VFR flight into IMC was the most significant cause of fatal
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commercial EMS helicopter accidents (NTSB, 1988) and
14 CFR Part 135 operator accidents in Alaska (NTSB,
1995), as well as a serious problem nation-wide, the FAA
reasoned this hazard far outweighed the risks associated
with an engine failure in IMC ("Commercial
passenger-carrying," 1997). The option to conduct an
BFR flight provides the benefits of the IFR system (i.e.,
safe obstacle clearance altitudes, ATC position following
and assistance, availability of en route weather information,
etc.) as well as a higher altitude from which to glide in the
unlikely event of an engine failure-benefits which would
otherwise be unavailable to the pilot when flying VFR at
low altitudes below the clouds.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Aviation Weather Services

In order to make safe preflight and inflight decisions
regarding the suitability of weather for VFR flight, pilots
need accurate, comprehensive, and up-to-the-minute
weather information specific to their route of flight.
Unfortunately, this information has not always been
available. In the United States, for example, the FAA is
strongly criticized for not providing the leadership
necessary to ensure the delivery of adequate weather
information to pilots, controllers, and other users of the
aviation system. Since 1995, at least four major reports
have been critical of the lack of coordination between the
FAA and the National Weather Service (NWS) which has
resulted in a "fragmented'' aviation weather system that at
times is "unable to respond fully to the valid needs of pilots
and other users" (National Research Council [NRC], 1995,
p. 3; FAA Research, 1997; USGAO, 1998).
Since the consolidation of 317 Flight Service Stations
(FSSs) in 1981 to the 61 Automated FSSs (AFSS) and 31
part-time and/or seasonal FSSs by the mid-1990s, many
question the FAA's commitment to providing an equal or
better level of service to users (NRC, 1995). The
replacement of FAA and NWS weather briefers, who
possess expert knowledge of local weather conditions, with
an expanding automated surface observation system
(ASOS) is also viewed by many aviation users as a
degradation of service (NRC, 1995; USGAO, 1998). For
example, ceiling and visibility values-both of which are
critical elements to VFR pilots—are measured differently by
ASOS and under certain conditions (e.g., rapidly changing
weather) are inaccurate. ASOS measures ceiling over a
narrow area directly overhead rather than over the entire
celestial dome, and visibility is determined by the opacity
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of air between a transmitter and receiver located less than
three feet apart (NRC, 1995).
The NRC (1995) recommended the FAA take action
to address three identified aviation user needs: improved
weather observations and forecasts; the distribution of
graphic weather products "that allow pilots, controllers,
and dispatchers to develop and maintain a consistent view
of current and forecast weather conditions" (p. 39); and
better weather training for pilots, controllers, and FSS
personnel. Even though a USGAO report rated their
progress as "very poor" (USGAO, 1998, p. 18), the FAA,
through its Safer Skies and Safe Flight 21 initiatives, is
addressing these weaknesses (FAA GA Joint Steering
Committee, 2001; FAA Office of Safe Flight 21,2002)
Air Traffic Control
VFR pilots may be reluctant to declare an emergency
and request ATC assistance to escape the possibility of a
CFIT accident resulting from scud running below the
clouds or to get themselves safely down from above a solid
overcast sky condition. It is not known to what extent the
threat of disciplinary action has precluded pilots who were
legitimately in trouble from requesting assistance. Most
certainly, if a pilot requests priority assistance from ATC in
the United States, the local FAA Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO) will be notified and they in turn are obliged
to conduct an investigation. However, pilots need to realize
that the FAA is well aware that some pilots may be more
afraid of confessing their need for help than they are of the
actual condition itself. Therefore, to encourage pilots to
take whatever steps necessary to achieve a safe outcome for
a flight, including requesting a flight assist from ATC in an
emergency (or urgency) situation, they rarely take
enforcement action unless absolutely necessary (BertoreUi,
n.d.; FAA, 2000). They prefer to talk with pilots (by
telephone or in person) to help them avoid such situations
in the future. Only if it is clearly a case of willful careless
or reckless operation of the aircraft, or the person is a
repeat offender, will they issue a warning or take
enforcement action (BertoreUi, n.d.; FAA, 2000).
TECHNOLOGY
Weather Data Delivery

New advancements in cockpit technology have the
potential to provide significant safety benefits to GA pilots.
One of the goals of the FAA's Safer Skies and Safeflight 21
programs (initiated in 1998 and 2000 respectively) is to
increase the availability of accurate inflight weather data
through technology which is "affordable by a significant
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portion of the GA fleet by 2007" (FAA GA Joint Steering
Committee, 2001, para. 3). The FAA's Flight Information
Service Data Link (FISDL), which provides nationwide
VHP frequencies for transmission of real-time weather
data, became operational in August 2000. The two
FAA-contracted service providers-ARNAV Systems and
Honeywell International—provide the ground infrastructure
for the data link. Aircraft equipped with the appropriate
receiver and multi-function display (MFD) can receive
textual weather products (METARs, TAFs, etc.) at no
charge and graphic information, such as NEXRAD radar
images, for a nominal fee (Goyer, 2000). The cost to the
consumer for receiver/MFD systems range from about
$8,000 to $13,500 (ARNAV Systems, 2001; Bendix/King,
n.d.)-certainly lower than comparable systems installed in
commercial air carrier aircraft, yet still likely not affordable
for many GA aircraft owners.
Alaska and Canada have experimented, to a limited
degree, with providing video camera images of real-time
weather conditions in remote mountainous areas to VFR
pilots. Expanding such coverage, especially in mountainous
regions, would provide VFR pilots with valuable real-time
weather information that might otherwise be unavailable.
In the United States it is conceivable that such images
could be delivered to VFR pilots through the FISDL
system, thus enhancing their decision making ability.
Terrain Awareness
Global Positioning System (GPS) and advancements
in computer-chip technology have contributed to the
proliferation of terrain awareness technology for GA
aircraft. This technology can be used as an aid to increase
the situational awareness of pilots who may find themselves
flying in marginal visual conditions. Most units display
terrain information derived from GPS position information
synchronized with a worldwide terrain elevation database.
For example, the Echo Flight system uses Landsat terrain
imagery to provide a color display that can actually help a
pilot to distinguish open areas from areas with buildings or
trees even in IMC or at night (Echo Flight, 2002). UPS
Aviation Technologies, Honeywell's Bendix/King, and
other manufacturers offer comparable systems, with some
providing visual and aural warning of terrain through an
Early Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS)
(Nordwall, 2000). The price for this technology ranges
from as low as $6,000 to about $15,000 (Echo Flight, 2002;
UPS Aviation Technologies, 2002).
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Technology that ultimately holds out the most
promise for VFR pilots is synthetic vision (S V). Using GPS
position information and an accurate terrain database, SV
provides the pilot with a high fidelity virtual-reality display
of the outside world. A variety of systems are currently
being developed. Some present information in a
three-dimensional moving display while others will
provide an out-the-window view with highway in the sky
(HITS) overlays (Braukus & Barnstorff, 1999; Sakrison,
2001). Theoretically such technology (and its costs) could
evolve to the point where the typical VFR pilot could look
directly out the window in IMC and/or at night and view
an accurate, realistic, and reliable computer-generated
visual scene of the outside workL Although these first
generation systems are designed to attract the general
aviation market, costs are likely to initially be high for
the typical GA aircraft owner.
PILOT TRAINING
Instrument Rating

In 1985, even though 46% of U.S. pilot certificate
holders possessed an instrument rating, only 23% of the
VFR-into-MC accidents between 1975 and 1986, and 27%
between 1982 and 1993, involved pilots with instrument
ratings (AOPA, 1996; NTSB, 1989; TSBC, 1990a). Also,
between 1976 and 1985, U.S. commercial pilots, 83% of
whom were instrument-rated in 1985, were proportionally
involved in significantly fewer VFR-into-IMC accidents
than their counterparts in Canada, where only 15% were
instrument-rated (TSBC, 1990a). In 1997, the FAA
eliminated the 125-hour total time requirement under 14
CFR Part 61.61 ("Pilot, Flight Instructor," 1997).
According to Scott Gardiner (personal communication,
April 26, 2002), Safety Program Manager at the Seattle
FSDO, low time pilots who meet the practical test
standards for an instrument rating, and who obtain and use
that rating, are less likely to scud run. VFR pilots should
recognize the increased safety benefits of instrument
training and possession of an instrument rating, and the
aviation educational community should do all in its power
to promote and facilitate such training. Risk Awareness
Training
In an effort to attract customers and to extol the
aviation safety record to the public, the aviation industry
has unwittingly been responsible for promulgating what
John King calls the Big Lie regarding GA safety (Wallace,
2001). This is most often illustrated in the statement; The
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most dangerous part of the flight is the drive to the airport."
The fact is, even though the GA accident rate per mile is
about one-tenth that of the motor vehicle rate, the fatal
accident rate is about seven times higher (AOPA, 1999).
Rather than shy away from discussions about risk, flight
instructors and aviation educators should be educating
students about the varying degrees of risk inherent in
specific flight operations. Informing pilots of the
probabilities, consequences, and situations in which
VFR-into-IMC accidents are likely is a necessary first
step in teaching them how to reduce the risks associated
with VFR flight in marginal weather conditions.
Hazardous Weather Awareness Training
To avoid hazardous weather, VFR pilots must be able
to recognize it, both through personal observation and the
proper interpretation of aviation weather forecasts and
reports. Not only does this require a significant level of
understanding of meteorological processes and weather
hazards to flight, but also the ability to generate adequate
predictions of future weather based on personal
observations and aviation weather reports. The training
necessary to achieve this certainly goes far beyond the
minimum Private Pilot ground school requirements
specified by most regulatory agencies. Collegiate aviation
programs are ideally suited to provide this type of training.
College-level aviation weather courses not only provide an
opportunity for a deeper understanding of meteorology and
the weather hazards peculiar to the flight environment, but
also the practical application of this knowledge through
simulated cross-country exercises integrated with weather
service products designed to help students determine the
suitability of weather for VFR flight.
The FAA Private Pilot Airmen Knowledge Test,
designed to test the level of an applicant's knowledge, is
considerably weak in this area. It wasn't until 1999 that
questions (only two) dealing with continued VFR flight into
adverse weather were finally introduced. However, the
databank continues to be heavily biased toward convective
and turbulence hazards and includes only one question on
low-pressure systems (altimeter errors). None specifically
identify warm frontal weather-both of which are associated
with extensive areas of low ceilings and visibilities
common to many VFR-into-IMC accidents (FAA, 2002). A
significant increase in the number of questions which seek
to apply weather theory to practical situations, such as
integrating weather report and forecast questions with a
sample cross-country trip (as is done in Private Pilot

JAAER, Fall 2003

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2003

knowledge tests in Canada), would also contribute to the
elevation of weather competency among newly certified
pilots.
Weather-Related Decision Making Training

The fact remains that either actively or by default,
pilots involved in these accidents made the decision to
initiate or continue VFR flight into adverse weather.
Human decision making has received considerable
attention by researchers over the past three decades, with a
subdiscipline developed and devoted strictly to aviation
known as aeronautical decision making (ADM).
Unfortunately, research has yielded few definitive findings
about this most complex of human thought processes. What
little has been discovered has also taken considerable time
to make its way into pilot training programs.
There is a substantial body of research that indicates
normal human decision making is often not very rational
and is subject to bias. For example, Wichman and Ball
(1983) and CVHare (1990) found that most GA pilots are
unrealistically optimistic regarding their chances of
experiencing an aircraft accident, and believe they possess
greater flying skill and are less likely to experience an
aircraft accident or take risks in flight, than their peers.
Wilson and Fallshore (2001) discovered these optimistic
and ability biases also extend to the VFR-into-IMC
scenario. They found that most VFR pilots are overly
optimistic regarding their chances of experiencing a
VFR-into-IMC accident, and are also overconfident in
their ability to both avoid and successfully fly out of IMC.
When evaluating all 14 CFRPart 91 aircraft accidents
between 1990 and 1997, Gob and Wiegmann (2001) also
found a significantly greater percentage of VFR-into-IMC
accident flights carried passengers on board. In Alaska,
50% of commercial pilots and operators surveyed flew
under VFR into IMC at least once in response to
operational pressures (NTSB, 1995). The role of social
pressure, along with how other decision biases may
contribute to what has historically been called
get-there-itis, is currently being examined by researchers
and will hopefully shed more light on why VFR pilots
continue to press on into deteriorating weather conditions.
Aviation educators and flight instructors play a key
role in teaching their students how to avoid a
VFR-into-IMC situation. One way is to simulate
hazardous weather recognition and weather-related
decision making through pencil and paper exercises,
computer-based training (CBT), and one-on-one or group
discussions. The FAA, AOPA,
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and other organizations are beginning to provide training
aids to help pilots in this area. The FAA sponsors an
experimental web site (http://flysafe.faa.gov) which,
through its Pilot Mastery Series, provides CD ROM and
on-line CBT programs designed to help VFR pilots visually
recognize the signs of deteriorating weather, determine how
to make decisions in such weather, and set personal
weather minimums for flight. It is hoped the development
of such programs will continue and eventually be
incorporated into the mainstream of pilot education
programs delivered by industry and the FAA.
Finally, modeling a healthy respect for marginal
weather and legal VFR weather minima teaches students by
example how to avoid adverse weather. However, since it
is likely that pilots will encounter such weather once they
leave the relatively safe confines of the flight-training
environment, there may be value in providing some actual
marginal-VFR weather training to pilots. Deliberately
exposing them to close-to-VFR-minimums could help them
both recognize adverse weather conditions and learn the
skills required to avoid inadvertent flight into IMC. The
dangers of scud running below clouds, especially at night
or in mountainous terrain, might also be more effectively
emphasized. However, there is the danger of setting a poor
example and possibly elevating the future risk-taking
behavior of these trainees. Therefore, it should be made
clear to them that this is specialized hazardous weather
avoidance training, and regular flight training in such
weather conditions should not take place.
CONCLUSION

VFR flight into IMC remains the leading cause of
fatal G A weather-related accidents and continues to be one
of the most frequent causes of all fatal GA accidents. Even
though much has been done to reduce the frequency of
these accidents, continued regulatory reforms and
improvements in the operational environment, technology,
and pilot training will further reduce the threat of this
hazard. In that spirit, the following recommendations are
made: Recommendations to FAA
1. The FAA should consider following the example of
other countries by increasing the minimum daytime VFR
visibility requirement to at least 2 miles in uncontrolled
(Class G) airspace below 1200 feet AGL.
2. The FAA should continue its efforts to improve the
quality of weather delivery to pilots including facilitating
the development of technology that provides real-time in-
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cockpit weather information,
especially in
remote mountainous areas.
3. The FAA should increase the number of TV weather
cameras in remote mountainous regions and make these
images available to pilots via the Internet.
4. The FAA should increase the number of Private Pilot
Airman Knowledge test questions that specifically deal
with continued VFR flight into deteriorating weather
conditions and the adverse weather associated with warm
frontal and low pressure systems. Questions that integrate
specific weather report and forecast elements that are
applicable to a sample cross-country trip would also elevate
the level of knowledge required of test applicants.
5. The FAA should continue its efforts regarding on-line
training aids such as tiieflysafe.faa.gov experimental web
site.
Recommendations to Industry

1. Part 135 VFR operators should consider taking
advantage of the 1998 changes to 14 CFR Part 135 that
allow operators, with certain stipulations, to fly SEIFR,
thereby providing an extra margin of safety.
2. The aerospace industry and the FAA should continue
to cooperate in the development of affordable cockpit
technology and weather data delivery systems that will
significantly increase safety for the low-end of the GA
market. Recommendations for Training
1. VFR Pilots should be taught how to determine their
own personal weather minimums for flight and the
importance of adhering to them when faced with the
pressure to fly below them.
2. Pilots should be encouraged to pursue their instrument
rating once the Private Pilot certificate has been earned.
3. Flight instructors should be truthful and should not
minimize the risks involved in flying an aircraft. Presenting
the risks involved in specific flight situations, including the
risks associated with scud running, should be accompanied
by an explanation of risk management concepts.
4. Flight instructors should incorporate hazardous
weather avoidance procedures applicable to the VFR-intoIMC scenario into their teaching.
5. Pilots should be taught not to allow the fear of
certificate action to outweigh the need to request assistance.
Teaching pilots to ask ATC or FSS for a "flight assist" and
explaining the probable outcomes of such a request can
help alleviate such fears.
6. Aviation psychologists and educators should continue

JAAER, Fall 2003

8

Wilson and Sloan: VFR Flight Into IMC: Reducing the Hazard

VFR Flight Into IMC
research into the various aspects of ADM and their findings
should be incorporated into pilot training programs. •>
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